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CONCEPT AND CONTRACT IN THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
John Linarelli*
INTRODUCTION
How will international law deal with the problems of large-scale
cooperation the peoples of the world now face and will continue to face in
the future? This is the very big question that Joel Trachtman deals with
in his book The Future of International Law.1 Trachtman’s book builds on
a theme from Wolfgang Friedmann’s classic 1964 book, The Changing
Structure of International Law. Friedmann argues that international law
is moving, and should move, from an international law of coexistence,
governing inter-state diplomacy, to an international law of cooperation,
governing “the pursuit of common human interests.”2 Trachtman argues
that “international law may grow in a way similar to municipal law:
establishing basic property rights and rules of security first and turning
to creation of public goods and regulatory purposes later.”3 International
law, according to Trachtman, “evolves functionally: it changes as its
constituents determine new uses.”4 In this rich account, Trachtman
shows how international law will have to be more extensive, broader in
scope, more comprehensive in the kinds of things it regulates, and more
*
Chair in Commercial Law, Durham University, Durham Law School. Formerly
Head of College, Swansea University College of Law. This Article benefitted from
presentation at the Global Challenges—Global Law symposium held at Swansea University
on 6–7 June 2013. Many thanks to the participants for discussion and comments. A special
thanks to Joel Trachtman for comments on a draft of this article. All errors are mine.
1. JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: GLOBAL GOVERNMENT
(2013) [hereinafter FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW].
2. WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW i
(1964).
3. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 1.
4.
Id. at 1.
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effective, to deal with “expected changes in globalization, economic
development, demography, technology and democracy.”5 International
lawyers should readily appreciate the basic insight of the book, as they
divide their work between the law of coexistence of states and matters of
a regulatory nature.
The book’s subtitle is boldly phrased “Global Government.”
Trachtman does not suggest that there will be any such thing as a world
state with a world government.6 Rather, the first sentence of the book
captures his claim: “International law is the precursor of international
government, and international government is nothing more than an
intensification of international law.”7 Trachtman favors “government”
over “governance” because he wants to focus on the “formal rules and
organizations: law.”8 He rejects the notion that a “certain institutional
intensity or scale is required in order for a mechanism to be considered
governmental.”9 Rather, government is “infinitely scalable” and it is
therefore “easy to say that international government exists.”10 According
to Trachtman, describing the government established by international
law as “rudimentary” because it does not look like national governments
is wrong given that the functions of these two sorts of governments
differ.11 Perhaps the reason why Trachtman contends that it is easy to
say that international government exists is because he bases his work on
the idea of the “function” of international law and organization. Early
work dealing with functionalism in international law and organization,
which Trachtman cites, contends that if increasing functions are given to
international organizations, loyalties to these organizations might
follow.12
Trachtman’s emphasis on functionality should be understood in the
context of the methodological toolkit he uses, found in new institutional
economics, in which he includes constitutional economics as a subfield.13
Trachtman is one of the most preeminent proponents of this particular
school of thought as a way of understanding international law. His 2008

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 13–16; see also DAVIE MITRANY, THE PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNMENT (1933).
13. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 13.
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book, The Economic Structure of International Law,14 is one of the most
influential on the economics of international law and has become
required reading in the field.
In this Article, I examine and critique two parts of The Future of
International Law. I then go on to explore how custom will fare in the
future of international law, as that future is understood in the book.
First, I deal with what I call the contractarian features of Trachtman’s
explanation for the existence and purpose of international law. Using the
tools of new institutional economics and constitutional economics,
Trachtman seeks to describe the features of an international legal
system. This is positive political theory or at least relates substantially to
the methods of positive political theory. I want to suggest a different
approach to understanding international law, one which connects to
normative political theory. In its ambitious sense, this approach sees
international law essentially as a form of moral argument, and in its
modest sense, which I favor, it offers a procedure for moral justification of
international law distinct from a conceptual analysis to identify it as law.
Second, I reframe what Trachtman calls the “fragmentation” of
international law to expose it to moral critique. The problem of
fragmentation, as Trachtman and others see it, is that there is no single
international legal system, but rather, distinct regulatory regimes, in
international law. Trachtman’s functional approach looks at
fragmentation as a practical problem of international law not reaching its
full functional potential. I contend that fragmentation poses a serious
moral problem for international law, in addition to the practical problem
that Trachtman identifies. Finally, I address the role of customary
international law. Does it have a role in an international law of
cooperation? I agree with Trachtman that it does and that its role will be
supplementary and diminished. In the future of international law, it is
likely that custom will play a role as part of the general international law
applicable to the various fragmented lex specialias of treaty obligations.
We must, moreover, be careful to distinguish custom from general
principles of law and other sources of international law.

I. A CONTRACTARIAN EXPLANATION OR PREDICTION FOR THE FUTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Future of International Law relies on a contractarian theory
about international law. In this section, I very briefly set forth the
14. JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2008)
[hereinafter ECONOMIC STRUCTURE].
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groundwork for this contractarian account. It is what we might
understand as positive political theory, about the way constitutions
might actually form or around how constitutionalization might actually
occur. It might be more broadly understood as connecting to a
contractarian form of moral argument, but this first requires that we
accept that law could be understood or justified from a moral point of
view. If we accept the moral account, what we are saying is that the
formal structure of norms in international law is either contractarian or
should be so to be morally justifiable and that these questions can be
answered in a rational bargaining account. Trachtman is an influential
proponent of the economic but not necessarily the moral version of
contractarianism. He appears to only accept contractarianism as a
description or explanation of international law or to use it in predicting
the future of international law, but not as a form of moral argument
about international law or its justification. Below I connect the rational
bargaining model to a philosophical tradition. Much economic thinking
historically grounds in some philosophical tradition (Hobbes, Hume, J.S.
Mill, etc.), and we may as well identify at least some of the connections
relevant to our concerns here if we are going to be clear on what
economists are doing. I identify the main elements of the bargaining
account as Trachtman has set forth in the book, and I also set forth my
account, which could be classified as normative political theory, and
which could be understood as in the tradition of contractualist moral
theory. A contractualist form of argument about the law situates around
the idea that the law must be reasonably acceptable, or more closely to
T.M. Scanlon’s formulation, around principles for the general regulation
of behavior that no one, suitably morally motivated, could reasonably
reject.15 I advocate that another way to justify the norms of international
law is through contractualism. Contractualism as moral and political
philosophy predicts nothing. Rather, it provides a way to justify law from
a moral point of view. I have given the reader almost nothing but a
skeleton of how we shall proceed, so bear with me as we work out the
argument.
Let’s start with Trachtman’s contractarian account. It is set forth in
more detail in his earlier book, The Economic Structure of International
Law, but his latest book provides a shorter yet adequate account for our
purposes here. Chapter 3 of The Future of International Law deals with
the function of international law and organization as a “system of

15. T. M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 5 (1998) [hereinafter WHAT WE
OWE].
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transnational political linkage.”16 In that chapter, Trachtman argues:
The future of international law is a set of functional, nuanced,
differentiated, and organic links between the political systems of different
states. As these links grow in terms of their mandatory character,
specificity, and institutional support, they will increasingly ascend the
scale from a more contractual type of international law to mechanisms
that appear to have more of the characteristics of government.17

Using the insights of game theory, Trachtman develops a “policyexchange contractual theory of international law, focusing on the
advancement of domestic preferences through international law.”18
Chapter 11 of The Future of International Law deals with
international law from a constitutional standpoint. The chapter outlines
three functions for international constitutional norms: enabling,
constraining, and supplementing.19 An enabling norm aids in the
formation of international law. A constraining norm limits the formation
of international law. A supplementing norm fills gaps in domestic
constitutional law, arising from globalization.20 The discussion of the
constitutional aspects of international law is grounded in constitutional
economics and relies substantially on the work of Nobel laureate James
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, who pioneered the field in such works as
The Calculus of Consent.21 As Trachtman explains:
Under this approach, constitutions are simply instruments of human
interaction: mechanisms by which to share authority in order to facilitate
the establishment of rules. In Buchanan’s phrase, they are instruments to
facilitate gains from trade—not from trade in the conventional sense, but
transactions in authority. In a transaction cost or strategic model,
constitutions are assumed to be designed to overcome transaction costs or
strategic barriers to Pareto superior outcomes. Once this is accepted, it
follows that constitutional rules are not natural law; instead, they are

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 41.
Id.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 255.
See generally JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
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political settlements designed to maximize the achievement of individual
citizens’ preferences.22

There is a lot to unpack in this quote, and it is a good launching point
for working out what economic contactarianism is and what its
alternatives are.
The above quote suggests that we have two choices, either a
contractarian or a natural law account.23 If we look at the history and
theory of international law, the natural law tradition was influential
from the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The “Grotian view” of
international law, as Philip Bobbit explains, “was taken to mean the
assertion of a duty on the part of the individual state to serve the
interests of the society of states as a whole” and is to be distinguished
from a “Hobbesian view” that “international society can have no legal
rules because there is no sovereign to organize and maintain the
collaboration among states . . . .”24 The Grotian view may be traced to
thinkers pre-dating Grotius, such as the Spanish Scholastics de Vitoria
and de Soto, as well as to Gentili, who held the post of Regius Professor of
Civil Law at Oxford.25 When the law and economics scholars became
prominent in the twentieth century, they were using logical positivist
models of economics, which exclude ethics, morality, and connections to
the history of ideas. In this sense, their approaches could be seen as
22. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 260.
23. Legal positivists have been criticized for ignoring international law. For the latest
foray, see Jeremy Waldron, International Law: “A Relatively Small and Unimportant” Part
of Jurisprudence?, in LUÍS DUARTE D’ALMEIDA, JAMES EDWARDS & ANDREA DOLCETTI,
READING HLA HART’S THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209–23 (2013). Bentham invented the phrase
“international law.” JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970); see also THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM (John Bowring ed., 1843); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 231 (1961).
Bentham was referring to a law of coexistence. It is widely understood that Hart’s famous
Chapter 10 in The Concept of Law was meant to be a favorable treatment to be contrasted
with those of earlier positivists. The difficulties that legal positivism has encountered in
elucidating the concept of international law are historical, but its contemporary version,
which has left the need for a sovereign behind, should encounter no special difficulties.
Legal positivism sometimes gets misunderstood because it is falsely associated with the
need for a sovereign law-giver or with a blind obedience to an unrealistic notion that what
counts as positive law must only be municipal law.
24. PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE AND THE COURSE OF
HISTORY 513 (2002).
25. Martti Koskenniemi, Empire and International Law: The Real Spanish
Contribution, 61 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (2011); Randall Lesaffer, The Classical Law of Nations
(1500-1800), in ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 408 (2011); DAVID ARMITAGE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
HISTORY OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL THOUGHT 9 (2013).
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alternatives to the natural law tradition in what was known as the law of
nations to the natural lawyers. This narrative provides a sense of
progress, which may indeed be a false sense, from a law of nations, a law
of coexistence, to a full-fledged international law of cooperation.
Friedmann says in his classic work that “the principal preoccupation of
the classical international law, as formulated by Grotius and the other
founders, was the formalization and the establishment of generally
acceptable rules of conduct in international diplomacy.”26 Trachtman says
that “[t]his was an international law of coexistence.”27
This is a debate that continues to this day. There appears to be the
beginnings of a new natural law turn in international law. In a
posthumously published article in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Ronald
Dworkin advocates a “return to what I take to be the golden age of the
subject, seventeenth-century European politics, to an at least partially
moralized conception of international law.”28
I have a few worries about the suggested duality between natural law
tradition of international law versus the economics of international law.
It is incomplete. From the philosophical, as opposed to the economic side
of the argument, it jumps from the early modern to the contemporary. It
leaves out the eighteenth century and a good deal of what went on in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It skips the Enlightenment. Why
skip Kant? This is something of a recurring theme in international law,
given that the field is widely accepted to have risen from the Grotian
view. International lawyers have characterized the divide somewhat
differently from Trachtman—as one between natural law and legal
positivism.29 I do not want to suggest a strict adherence to Kant here or to
his work on international society, Towards Perpetual Peace.30 And, I
certainly do not want to ignore the considerable Kantian tradition in
26. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 5.
27. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 3.
28. Ronald Dworkin, A New Philosophy for International Law, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 2,
13 (2013). Recently, Jeremy Waldron has argued for a contemporary jus gentium to discern
common legal principles that state legal systems share, to regulate relations within states.
See generally JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL MANKIND:” FOREIGN LAW
IN AMERICAN COURTS (2012). Waldron wants us to use Dworkin’s concept of principles
across municipal legal traditions. These moves by Dworkin and Waldron roughly parallel
the concepts of jus inter gentes and jus gentium, though it is by no means clear that they
want us to treat the formal legal categories as entirely distinct.
29. Friedmann exposes the arguments and concludes that a natural law approach to
the evolution of international law “is not a solution but a camouflaging of the real
problems.” FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 77. But, note that Friedmann took what might be
considered to be the wrong view of positivism.
30. Immanuel Kant, Towards Perpetual Peace, in IMMANUEL KANT PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 317 (Mary J. Gregor, ed. & trans., 1996) (first published in German in 1795).
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international law.31 We should not forget that Kant criticized Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Vattel as “sorry comforters” of a status quo supporting
offensive war.32
The project I advocate here is something like that of normative
jurisprudence about domestic law. While recognizing that, in the history
of ideas since about the seventeenth century, there has been a division
between internal and external affairs of state, and between municipal
and international law, this intellectual history should not be ignored.33
Though he was writing about how-to-do moral philosophy, I follow Tom
Hill’s lead: A line of work with Kantian aspirations that does not strictly
adhere to Kant’s practical philosophy can flourish. Kantian-inspired
moral theorists, sometimes known as Neo-Kantians, respect the dignity
of each person in their accounts and decide upon moral principles from an
“impartial” standpoint.34 In fact, a variety of moral theories that would
violate fundamental precepts of Kantian moral theory are still widely
accepted as Kantian inspired. Contractualism is one of them.35
The distinction I want to draw is between contractualism and
contractarianism. It is a distinction made by Samuel Freeman, between
interest-based and right-based contractarianism, though, following
Stephen Darwall, I and others use the word “contractualism” for the
right-based version.36 I contend that a suitable, Kantian-inspired
procedure of moral justification for international law can be developed
along contractualist lines. The basic elements of a contractualist account
to law or morality would include the following:37
a. Justification to others. This element is usually formulated as a
requirement that we justify our action on general principles to regulate
our behavior on terms others must reasonably accept, or in Scanlon’s
formulation, no one can reasonably reject. Think of these notions in terms

31. For just two examples: see, e.g., FERNANDO R. TESÓN, A PHILOSOPHY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1998); Amanda Perreau-Saussine, Immanuel Kant on International
Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas
eds., 2010).
32. Kant, supra note 30, at 326.
33. ARMITAGE, supra note 25, at 10.
34. THOMAS E. HILL, VIRTUE, RULES AND JUSTICE 1, 197, 201–02 (2012).
35. Let’s bracket as beyond our limited discussion here T. M. Scanlon, How I Am Not
a Kantian, in DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS, VOLUME TWO 116 (2011).
36. Samuel Freeman, Moral Contractarianism as a Foundation for Interpersonal
Morality, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN MORAL THEORY 57 (James Drier ed., 2006)
[hereinafter Moral Contractarianism]; STEPHEN DARWALL, CONTRACTARIANISM/
CONTRACTUALISM (2002).
37. What follows is influenced by Friedmann. See FRIEDMANN, supra note 2.

2014]

CONCEPT AND CONTRACT

of demands a person might make on another person, or an obligation a
person might have to another person. We give content to demands,
obligations, and judgments about right and wrong. That content comes
from putting ourselves in the place of others, and those others doing the
same for us.
b. Reasonableness not rationality. Reasonableness relates to the idea of
justification to others. My demands have to be reasonable to you and
yours to me. Reasonableness specifies the normative. Rationality, in
contrast, concerns how people actually behave. We want people to act
reasonably, but their actual behavior may conform to means-ends
rationality or to some other norm, as human behavior is understood from
the standpoint of behavioral economics, psychology, or other social
sciences. Rational behavior can be unreasonable and does not form the
basis for moral principles.
c. Moral equality. In contractualism, each person is of equal dignity and
respect. Moral equality affects the way we understand moral
accountability to each other. It is a basic notion that affects what is
permissible in a hypothetical agreement and the reasonableness of
putative moral principles.
d. Idealized deliberation and hypothetical agreement. Contractualist moral
theories rely on hypothetical agreement among moral equals, usually in
some sort of idealized conditions such as Rawls’s veil of ignorance in the
original position. Scanlon argues that we can deliberate hypothetically
without Rawls’s conditions.38 What is left in the culmination of this work
out are principles with the weakest objections to them. Contractualist
methods do not aggregate interests except in limited conditions.
Agreement is not the subject of a bargain. Bargaining permits people to
take power and position into account and can lead to unreasonable
principles.
e. Normative not naturalistic. Contractualism is not social science. It is
justificatory and not predictive. It is not designed to offer predictions
about the way people actually behave or about how institutions might
arise as a result of incentives and behavior. People may actually behave

38. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE, supra note 15, at 5.
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quite differently from the way they should behave if judged by the
standards of properly deliberating moral agents. Contractualism is a
theory about how persons justify their behavior to others in a moral sense.
It is not a theory external to the way people actually reason morally.
Rather, the focus is gaining clarity on the form of the moral argument. Its
method of justification, however, wide reflective equilibrium, requires us
to take into account all considered judgments, not just moral judgments,
particularly when extended into the realm of law and public policy.39 Such
questions help us to articulate moral principles that are suitably
interpersonal and agent relative.
f. Nonreductionist. Contractualism is what Samuel Freeman calls rightbased, which means that moral principles are not explained by some other
non-moral facts, such as self-interest or prudence.
g. General principles for the regulation of human action and deliberation.
Hypothetical agreement can result in general principles to regulate
human action. Here, moral principles can be used to evaluate or justify
legal rules.
h. Actual world application. Though the hypothetical agreement is one of
idealized conditions, the principles it produces make claims on actual
persons in the actual world.
i. Interpersonal and agent relative. In its notion of agreement,
contractualism takes into account the reasonable plans, purposes, and
relationships of moral agents. Things that give a person’s life meaning are
taken into account. The truth of moral judgment depends on these
personal interests.

With these basic elements at hand, we can see why contractualism is
to be distinguished from contractarianism. Both approaches share the
notion of agreement among persons, but from there they differ
considerably. In interest-based contractarianism, self-interested persons
make bargains relating to cooperation or (coexistence) based on rational
self-interest. Rationality in an interest-based contractarian world is
means-end rationality. Interest-based contractarianism gives content to
legal rules as reflecting the outcomes of hypothetical bargains in which
39. SAMUEL FREEMAN, JUSTICE AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 18–20 (2007).
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persons are permitted to take their rational self-interest into account.
Justification to others has no role. Partiality is entirely acceptable and
indeed quite predictable in contractarianism. People, and in the case of
international society, states, can freely use their power in contractarian
bargaining to get what they want. In right-based contractualism, persons
reach agreement on the terms of their cooperation (and coexistence)
based on impartiality and standards of reasonableness. Right-based
contractualism justifies legal rules as reflecting the outcomes of
hypothetical agreements that no moral agent could reasonably reject. In
a contractualist world, states are required to take impartial standpoints
in dealing with other states in international law-making activities and
international law would have to comply with moral principles
appropriately suited to international institutions.
It is important that we clarify the concepts we are using. Trachtman’s
contractarianism is economic. He does not deploy it in a strategy of moral
justification. Rather, his argument is predictive and explanatory. It is
social science. As an explanatory or predictive theory, Trachtman
carefully identifies the limits of cooperation. Cooperation is unlikely
unless it is in the interests of the participants to cooperate and
transaction costs are low enough. But, if these conditions exist, then what
would be the purpose of law in the first place? This is a Coasean ideal in
which people can bargain to an efficient result regardless of the law. In
the domestic variants of this model, when transaction costs are high
enough, we need a sovereign. If we need a sovereign, we have to accept
the Hobbesian view: no law without a sovereign. This reasoning played
out in the literature when economic accounts of international law were
beginning to take hold.40 Trachtman comes out on the side of
international law. His basic claim is that international law is the form
that state cooperation takes.
Trachtman’s
economic
contractarianism
and
my
moral
contractualism are complementary in their roles. If we enter into the
realm of cooperation, and we value law from a moral point of view, then
we need a theory-like contractualism to justify that cooperation. We
might use game theory to predict when cooperation might occur or to
evaluate actual compliance with the law, but the law itself should also
have the sort of moral legitimacy that a contractualist procedure of moral
justification can provide, if we value law’s legitimacy in a moral sense.
The easy acceptance of the use of power for private gain in the moral
40. Compare TRACHTMAN, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 14, at ix–xi, and
ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (2008),
with JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
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version of contractarianism is problematic for norm formation in
international law.
Why not simply do as Dworkin says and return to the humanist
“golden age?” After all, contractualism, as well as contractarianism, is
typically associated with the social contract tradition. Should we not limit
its relevance to what happens in states? I offer three responses to these
doubts.
First, contractualism as a moral theory is about the form of moral
argument, not about the political obligations of citizens to each other in
states.41 Second, as explained above, the humanist tradition in
international law was designed for an international law of coexistence,
and frankly, justified some questionable action. It produced the worst
sorts of justifications for colonial expansion, offensive war, predation, and
exploitation. In a world of pervasive global cooperation, we need a theory
to deliver a justification for law to set that cooperation in motion in a way
that appeals to the considered moral convictions of peoples in societies
who may be in worse-off positions than monarchs and trading companies,
or in the contemporary context, elites, the rich and powerful, and
multinational enterprises.
Consider these issues from the standpoint of trade. Trade was central
to the humanism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which
conceptualized as natural the connection between use of force and
freedom to trade. The natural lawyers argued, among other things, that
freedom to trade is a natural right; that man cannot establish
institutions to get in the way of free trade; that land, if not properly
cultivated and used productively in a European sense, could be freely
appropriated because it is God’s creation being wasted; and that self-help
to enforce nature’s law is justified.42 Humanist-inspired accounts may not
41. See T.M. Scanlon, The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1992).
42. See generally RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: POLITICAL
THOUGHT AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER FROM GROTIUS TO KANT (1999); MARTINE JULIA
VAN ITTERSUM, PROFIT AND PRINCIPLE: HUGO GROTIUS, NATURAL RIGHTS THEORIES AND
THE RISE OF DUTCH POWER IN THE EAST INDIES (1595–1615) (2006); Peter Borschberg, Hugo
Grotius’ Theory of Trans-Oceanic Trade Regulation: Revisiting Mare Liberum (1609) 34
(Inst. of Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2005/14, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=871752.
Friedmann argues, reminiscent of Bentham, about natural law: “Any attempt to stamp
a particular social order as being consonant with nature, and correspondingly, another as
being contrary to nature, is a disguised way of giving the halo of perpetuity and
sacrosanctity to a particular political or legal philosophy.” FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 78.
In this passage, Friedmann cites to a work by a well-known arbitrator of the time, F.A
Mann, who argued that the payment of prompt, full, and adequate compensation in a
nationalization of a foreign investment is a principle of natural law. These principles were
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need to go down this route and can deviate from their intellectual
ancestors, just as Kantian-inspired accounts do. Whether they will lose
something fundamental about the natural in such a progression remains
to be seen.
Third, strategies of moral justification influenced by the
Enlightenment have been successful in identifying the moral relevance of
institutions. Continuing with the trade discussion, in the sort of largescale cooperation that Trachtman addresses in The Future of
International Law, trade requires institutions. Institutions comprising a
global order for economics and commerce create what Matthias Risse
calls shared membership in the global order.43 Institutions are humancreated social practices. Markets are not natural entities like planets or
trees. They do not exist in a state of nature. Their structure is not
inevitable, existing outside the reach of any government. In fact, their
structure depends on government. How we design markets is up to us
and based on what we value. The inequality that comes from markets is
within our control. When we deliberate about what we value, it is
unlikely that we will only consider economic efficiency or economic liberty
as relevant. We might want some form of fairness to set the terms of a
cooperative endeavor, though we might disagree on what fairness
requires. If it is the case that markets cannot exist without institutions,
or cannot exist to the extent that they do as national and global
economies without institutions, then we might want to be able to justify
economic inequality brought about or perpetuated by these institutions.
We also want to know how state power in trade negotiations may be
exercised legitimately. These are questions that contractualism is wellequipped to answer.
Contractualism is about the moral legitimacy of international law. It
might come into the formation of international law if we accept that
states (and their officials) have what Dworkin calls a duty to improve the
moral legitimacy of international law.44 Contractualist principles might
also lead to particular reactive attitudes about the actions of states and
their officials. But, even with contractualism as a moral theory, we still
need a way to pick out which social practices are norms of international
law. We could adopt Dworkin’s strategy and fuse concepts about law into
a form of moral argument. I suggest a less ambitious approach, cohering
with the distinction between analytical and normative jurisprudence
probably controversial at the time of Friedmann’s writing, before the rise of neoliberal
economic order starting in the late 1980s.
43. See MATTHIAS RISSE, ON GLOBAL JUSTICE (2012).
44. Dworkin, supra note 28, at 19–22. Is this a theme about duty of officials going
back to Wasserman?
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about domestic law and with the way that many moral philosophers
engage with questions of moral justification.
How we go about picking out which social practices are norms of
international law will depend on the beliefs and attitudes of persons who
use and are subject to the law. Subordination to a hierarchy known as a
sovereign is unnecessary for a positivist account of the law. As Alexander
Orakhelashvili explains:
It is . . . difficult to see how the positiveness of law—that its postulation in
an externally intelligible manner to repeatedly apply to facts covered by
its content—inherently includes the element of subordination through
command. It is right to say that such subordination is one way of creating
positive law but portraying such subordination as the necessary condition
for that would entail a logical conceptual overstretch.45

My account of a transnational conception of legal positivism tries to
dissolve the notion of the sovereign as an enabling condition for the law.
A transnational conception of legal positivism, one which removes the
state as an enabling condition for a legal system, might require that any
candidate for legal practice meet five conditions: (1) acceptance by the
participants in the legal system, the norm users, of the rules of the order
as valid, binding, and authoritative; (2) systemic qualities of normative
consequence within the putative legal system, making the normative
order the system represents intelligible or comprehensible to the
participants; (3) secondary rules and secondary rule officials, though they
can be distributed across different state and non-state hierarchies,
serving mainly an epistemological role in assisting in the identification of
valid legal rules, particularly given conditions; (4) shared agency between
secondary rule officials demonstrating sufficient mutual responsiveness
and joint commitment for a legal system; and (5) primary rules dealing
with issues that legal systems usually deal with, such as property,
contract, rights, duties, and dispute resolution. The fourth condition
relies on Scott Shapiro’s planning theory of law, which is based on
Michael Bratman’s descriptions of shared agency, in particular his notion
of a shared intentional activity.46 I have used this account to elucidate
the features of transnational commercial law.47 It can be extended to
45. Alexander Orakhelashvili, Introduction, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY
at 8.

AND HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 25,
46. SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 119–20 (2011).

47. John Linarelli, Analytical Jurisprudence and the Concept of Commercial Law, 114
PENN STATE L. REV. 119, 198 (2009).
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fields of international law.48

II. FRAGMENTATION
In The Future of International Law, Trachtman identifies the
property of fragmentation in international law. He explains that
international law is fragmented because “it tends to make and
administer rules in separate functional categories, often without a clear
and effective system for integrating the resulting rules.”49
Fragmentation, according to Trachtman, comes from the “rudimentary”
nature of international law.50 “Greater integration” of international law
might be required to deal with particular circumstances: (1) “natural
overlaps between policy measures”; (2) to facilitate “broader and longerterm reciprocity when making agreements”; (3) when one type of
agreement “might serve to balance out the distributive effects” of
another; and (4) when “economies of scale or scope in the development of
institutions” exist.51 Fragmentation relates to what Trachtman calls
“congestion” in international law, the situation in which international
law is increasingly called upon to regulate more areas or existing areas
more intensively.52 “With congestion comes collision” and if the collision
produces undesirable consequences, then we might say it is because of
the fragmented nature of international law.53 It is a “developmental
problem of the international governmental system, in which there is a lag
between congestion and measures to produce coherence.”54
Fragmentation receives ongoing attention in the academic literature.55

48. John Linarelli, International Law: Practical Authority, Global Justice, 103 AM.
SOC’Y INTL L. PROC. 382, 383 (2010).
49. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 9.
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id. at 9–10.
52. Id. at 217.
53. Id. at 217.
54. Id. at 222.
55. See, e.g., MARIO PROST, THE CONCEPT OF UNITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2012); Joel Trachtman, The International Law of Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity,
Fragmentation and Cooperation, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 719 (2010); Eyal Benvenisti, The
Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60
STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007); Tim Stephens, Multiple International Courts and the
“Fragmentation” of International Environmental Law, 25 AUS. YBIL L. 227 (2006); Bruno
Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of Planets and the Universe: Self Contained Regimes in
International Law, 17 EURO. J. INT’L L. 483 (2006). Martti Koskenniemi deals with
fragmentation in the context of custom and its codification. MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 389–97 (2005).
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A way to understand fragmentation exists which, I think, is
illuminating, but which may not be obvious to international lawyers. It
connects to the contractualist discussion of the prior section, and it comes
from Rawls. Rawls uses the concept of a “well-ordered society” in his
political philosophy.56 For Rawls, a well-ordered society is one in which
all reasonable persons within it accept the same public conception of
justice, their acceptance and the principles of justice are public
knowledge, and the principles of justice are reflected in the society’s laws
and institutions, in what Rawls calls the basic structure of society.57
Well-ordered societies can be “liberal” or “decent.”58 Reasonable members
of well-ordered liberal societies conceptualize themselves as free and
equal and as having a liberal conception of justice.59 Reasonable members
of well-ordered decent societies may accept hierarchy in their societies
but accept a non-liberal common good conception for their society.60 In
The Law of Peoples, Rawls argues that the best we could hope for is a
“reasonably just society of peoples” comprised of these well-ordered
societies.61 On this foundation, Rawls specifies eight principles, which
parallel well-accepted doctrines of public international law, citing to
Brierly’s Law of Nations.62 In effect, Rawls specifies an international law
of coexistence for well-ordered societies.
In Rawls’s theory, a well-ordered liberal society has a public
conception of justice and that conception of justice is implemented in the
basic structure of society. The basic structure of society includes a
domestic legal system, though the debate continues about the legal
categories included in the basic structure of society and hence subject to
Rawlsian principles of justice.63 We could also draw rough comparisons to
56. See John Rawls, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in COLLECTED PAPERS 254–55
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
57. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 453–54 (rev. ed. 1999); JOHN RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 15 (1993); JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 8
(Erin Kelly ed., 2001); JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 4–5 (1999) [hereinafter LAW OF
PEOPLES].
58. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 57, at 3.
59. Id. at 3–4.
60. Id. at 4.
61. Id. at 124.
62. Id. at 37 n.42 (citing J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF PEACE (6th ed. 1963)). Rawls also cites to TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY AND
THE RELATIONS OF STATES (1983). Nardin is a political theorist.
63. See Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Blankfein Tabachnick, The Rawlsian View of
Private Ordering, 25 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 288, 288–89 (2008); Kevin A. Kordana & David H.
Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1279,
1288–90 (2006); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 598–600 (2005).
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Raz’s earlier writings about the claims of comprehensiveness, supremacy,
and openness of municipal legal systems.64 So, at the domestic level, we
have both a public conception of justice, reflected in the legal system and
institutions of government of the state in question, and which that legal
system and these institutions claim to be comprehensive in scope of
coverage. Trachtman calls this the “gold standard” for a legal system,
which could be read to mean that he does not ascribe anything essential
to the properties of a legal system I have just described.65 But I do think
that there is a significant explanatory power in the distinctions that I am
drawing here.
I have just very summarily sketched that part of Rawls’s The Law of
Peoples offering an ideal theory, an exploration of human possibilities in
the form of a “realistic utopia.”66 Part of his argument is that we could
not conceive of a realistic utopia for the world which would require his
two principles of justice to apply outside of or across societies.67 For
Rawls, the sort of “social cooperation” (a phrase essential to Rawls’s
contractualist theory)68 which would be necessary for a realistic utopia of
global justice,69 implemented through international law and international
government, would simply be too incredible for us to accept.
But, if international law evolves into a law of cooperation, and if the
political philosophers are right that a global basic structure of society
already exists or is on the rise,70 might we start holding international law
to something like a public conception of global justice? Is a utopia
demanding more rigorous principles of justice starting to become more
realistic? Trachtman argues that fragmentation may or may not be a
problem depending on the circumstances. I believe it is more generally a
problem because it relates to a form of social cooperation that would be
needed for international law to truly become a law of cooperation.
Fragmentation is not contingent or dependent on circumstances, nor is it
occasional. It is conceptual. It is a general structural feature of
international law, applicable across all of the categories of international
64. If we do so, we should bear in mind the very different projects Raz and Rawls
undertook. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 116–20
(1979); JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY
OF LEGAL SYSTEM (1980).
65. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 27.
66. RAWLS, LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 57, at 6.
67. Id. at 36.
68. The citations would be numerous. See, e.g., Rawls, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra
note 57, at 22.
69. Such a global justice would include distributive justice.
70. Charles Beitz produced the early influential work, but there are many others. See
CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1979).
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law.
To understand why fragmentation is a serious problem for
international law, we first need to get clear on what we mean by
cooperation. In game theory, cooperation is something to be predicted; the
terms of that cooperation are usually the result of the behavioral
assumptions we make about the players and about their payoffs.
Cooperation in game theory usually requires a set of conditions to
produce a narrow set of cooperative outcomes, such as common pools
resources or limited forms of collective action such as infinitely repeating
exchanges.71 A more ambitious moral approach to game theoretic
cooperation is the rational bargaining solution to social cooperation,
discussed above, an interest-based contractarian account.72 The
difference between economic and moral contractarianism, as explained in
the prior section, is that the moral contractarian argues that
contractarianism is a theory about moral justification, in addition to (or
instead of) being an explanatory and predictive theory about how people
behave.
These differences suggest a two-fold classification for understanding
cooperation: one in which we ask why people cooperate and the other in
which we ask about the terms of that cooperation. If we are only asking
why people cooperate and we are trying to predict when cooperation will
occur, then the terms of the cooperation might not be so important to us.
In these cases, fragmentation may not concern us, or at least not concern
us in all cases. But, if we evaluate the terms of that cooperation, then
fragmentation becomes a bigger problem. If we evaluate fragmentation
using the terms of cooperation set by familiar moral concepts of right or
good, which require that cooperation help people lead decent lives, then
fragmentation means there is no cooperation, and that cooperation has
failed in a moral sense, even if it is succeeding in a predictive or economic
sense.
Let’s add into the discussion the problem of agency (in an economic
and not a moral sense) that international law faces. At the international
level, no “government” exists that might be said to be an agent of people,
at least not directly so. This is a familiar and well-examined issue in
international law scholarship, one which The Future of International Law
addresses.73
71. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984); RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982).
72. See, e.g., DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); Freeman, Moral
Contractarianism, supra note 36.
73. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 269, 282–83.
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International law has a long way to go to get close to being a law of
cooperation, if we understand cooperation in its moral sense. Though we
may not be able to hold actual domestic legal systems to Rawlsian ideals
either, we can say without reservation that international law is seriously
disordered, more so than at least developed and mature domestic legal
systems. And with disorder comes fragmentation. This serious disorder
should not surprise us. It comes from years of power and sovereignty
being the ultimate arbiter of what counts as international law.
Examples of serious disorder are numerous. Fragmented regulatory
regimes are necessarily partial to what they are regulating. An example
that many like to use is trade and the environment. The World Trade
Organization Appellate Body made a significant advance in its
Shrimp/Turtles decision by effectively creating a balancing test for
evaluating the legality of trade measures to protect the environment.
General Agreements on Tariff and Trade (“GATT”), article XX(g)
provides:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a
disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
contracting party of measures . . . relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.74

The Appellate Body interpreted GATT, article XX(g) to provide for a
balancing test: “[T]he measures falling within the particular exceptions
must be applied reasonably, with due regard both to the legal duties of
the party claiming the exception and the legal rights of the other parties
concerned.”75 In finding U.S. measures overbroad and not the least
restrictive means to achieve non-trade aims, the Appellate Body in
Shrimp/Turtles ruled that the U.S. failure to engage in international
efforts to achieve its intended aims weighed against a finding that the

74. World Trade Organization, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX,
TIAS 1700 (1947).
75. Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, ¶ 151, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) (quoting Appellate Body Report,
United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R
(May 20, 1996)); see Joel P. Trachtman, The Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV.
INT’L L.J. 333, 361–64 (1999) [hereinafter Shrimp and Shrimp Products].
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U.S. measure was lawful under GATT, article XX(g).76 While dispute
settlement decisions of this sort go a long way to deal with
fragmentation, still specialized tribunals are limited in what they can
achieve. A single counterexample makes the point: there could be a case
in which an environmental treaty requires a WTO member to do
something that is clearly not the least restrictive means available from
the standpoint of international trade, and there is nothing the Appellate
Body could do other than to rule against the WTO member in any WTO
dispute settlement proceeding. Of course, this WTO member would
probably be unlikely to agree to any such treaty in the first place, if the
WTO lawyers advise him or her that entering into such a treaty would
violate preexisting WTO obligations. This is an example of how
fragmentation produces disorder in international law.77
Fragmentation will persist in the forms of “limited government” we
currently have in international law and organization. The focus on order
versus disorder and moral versus economic forms of cooperation hopefully
can assist in the search for solutions that are both efficacious and just.

III. WHAT ABOUT CUSTOM?
What is the role of customary international law as international law
moves towards an international law of cooperation? There seems to be no
clear position on this question in The Future of International Law, which
is perhaps telling about the decline in importance in custom if we are to
move towards an international law of cooperation. In the discussion of
fragmentation in the book, we receive a clear signal of why this is true.
To quote, “when customary international law was the primary means for
making international law, and its products were generally universal,
fragmentation was a significantly less pressing issue.”78 Two reasons for
this are offered. First, custom “had the ability to be nuanced, and to take
into account varying concerns—after all, it was socially rooted in
behavior, not produced at diplomatic conferences narrowly focused on a
particular issue.”79 Second, to the extent custom is universal, the problem
of multiple legislators did not exist.80 Fragmentation, says Trachtman, “is
largely an artifact of treaty law made in different fora, with different

76. Id. at ¶¶ 168, 169, 177.
77. Of course, I do not deal with the effects of a subsequent treaty on the legal
obligations under a prior treaty under domestic law.
78. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 226.
79. Id. at 226.
80. Id. at 226.
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groups of parties.”81
In his 1964 book, Friedmann foresaw the decline of customary
international law:
It is an obvious reflection of the radically different character and methods
of international relations in our time that custom can no longer be as
predominant or important a source of law as it was in the formative
period of international law. [C]ustom is too clumsy and slow moving a
criterion to accommodate the evolution of international law in our time,
and the difficulties are increased as the number of subjects of the law of
nations swells from a small club of Western Powers to 120 or more
“sovereign” states. More importantly, custom is an unsuitable vehicle for
international “welfare” or “co-operative” law. The latter demands positive
regulation of economic, social, cultural and administrative matters, a
regulation that can only be effective by specific formulation and
enactment. It is only because the classical international law was
overwhelmingly concerned with the mutual obligations of abstention and
tolerance governing the diplomatic intercourse between nations that
custom, arising out of state practice, could play a predominant role. It
must be replaced by more articulate and specific instruments of lawmaking, i.e. in the absence of an international legislative body, by
bilateral or multilateral treaties . . . . Even in some of the domains of
classical international law, as in the various aspects of the Law of the Sea,
multilateral conventions arising out of the preparatory work of
international bodies and international conferences, tend to replace
custom.82

Friedmann was not simply negative about the role of custom in the
future of international law. His conclusion was that custom, “while
plainly inadequate as a major source of modern international law, in the
rapidly expanding, complex[,] and articulate pattern of modern
international relations is still an important factor in the evolution or
modification of the principles of classical international law, governing the
adjustment of national sovereignties.”83
Olufemi Elias and Chin Leng Lim, in The Paradox of Consensualism
in International Law, citing Friedmann, made this point again in the
1990s, but in the context of providing a defense for custom as an
81. Id. at 226.
82. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 121–22.
83. Id. at 123 (citation omitted).
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important source of international law:
The nature of customary international law (based traditionally as it is on
the accumulation of the individual practices and perceptions of States)
and the consequent tardiness in the customary law-making process tend
to result in the view that international custom is unable to address these
issues satisfactorily. Customary law would seem to be better suited to an
international law of coexistence as distinct from the demands of an
international law of cooperation and interdependence.84

Elias and Lim went on to argue that a treaty is effective primarily
when a preexisting “political consensus” supports it.85 In other words,
“the continued efficacy of a treaty is not a question of treaty law.”86
In his contractarian account, Trachtman has developed, with George
Norman, a repeated multilateral prisoner’s dilemma model for the
formation of and compliance with customary international law.87 In The
Future of International Law, Trachtman extends this account to deal
with the decision-making process and lobbying within states and to the
formation of and compliance with international law generally.88 This
form of rational cooperation may lead to alternative institutional design
choices, including treaties. There may also be cases in which customary
international law might be binding when the conditions of the game are
not met and those situations just might be the acid test of why customary
international law has the force that it does, or in the terminology of new
institutional economics, why customary international law matters.89
Friedmann can be said to be making five claims about the role of
custom in a future international law of cooperation. First, he claims that
custom cannot provide the sort of concrete, fine-grained, positive rules
necessary for regulation.90 Second, he claims that custom is “too clumsy
and slow moving” for an international law of cooperation.91 Third,
84. OLUFEMI A. ELIAS & CHIN LENG LIM, THE PARADOX OF CONSENSUALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 173–74 (1998) [hereinafter CONSENSUALISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW] .
85. Id. at 190.
86. Id.
87. George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game,
99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541 (2005).
88. TRACHTMAN, FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1, at 54–64.
89. I borrow a catchphrase of new institutional economics loosely here. See Rudolf
Richter, The Role of Law in New Institutional Economics, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 13
(2008); John N. Droback, Law Matters, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 97 (1998).
90. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 122.
91. Id. at 122. Elias and Lim use the word “tardiness.” ELIAS & LIM, CONSENSUALISM
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 84.
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customary international law is meant for a small club of “Western
powers” and does not reflect the realities of international society.92
Fourth, customary international law has a limited domain, dealing only
with coexistence.93 Fifth and finally, Friedmann argues that customary
international law tends to get replaced by convention anyway as the law
and activity relating to it becomes more complex.94 Each of these claims
will be addressed in turn.
First, the argument that customary international law is unsuitable
for an international law of cooperation because it does not provide
concrete, fine-grained, and positive rules seems to fail. Let’s assume for
the sake of argument that customary rules are more general or open
textured than treaty rules. This is a dubious generalization, as many
legal rules found in treaties are similar in the respects that Friedmann
finds problematic. Compare the most favored nation and national
treatment provisions of a typical trade treaty with the legal rules of use
of force in self-defense, for example. That rules have this structure,
however, does not mean they are unsuitable for a law of cooperation.
Similar rules are in abundance in the domestic law of political
communities, in which robust principles of justice are relevant, if one
accepts the sort of contractualist political theory discussed in the prior
sections. The codes of legal systems in the civilian tradition are full of
such general principles, as is judge-made law in countries of the common
law tradition. The meanings of these simple rules are often “filled in”
through commentary, by case law, through restatements, and so on.
These arguments do not require us to accept the naïve notion that
general rules of law fully determine every case that comes before a court
or a tribunal. The basic point here is that what Friedmann identifies is
an issue for law generally, domestic or international, and indeed for any
sort of cooperation by humans that seek to be governed by rules.
Second, Friedmann claims that custom is “too clumsy and slow
moving” for an international law of cooperation.95 Whether this is true
depends on what international lawyers mean when they refer to
customary international law. My worry here is that confusion persists on
that very basic question of a conceptual nature.
The Statute of the International Court of Justice identifies custom as
“evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”96 It has been a
92. FRIEDMANN, supra note 2, at 122.
93. Id. at 122.
94. Id. at 122.
95. Id. at 122.
96. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat 1031 (entered
into force Oct. 24, 1945).
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longstanding practice to identify custom using two elements: state
practice and opinio juris. In the merits decision of the International
Court of Justice in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua, the court deemphasized the state practice element, finding
customary international law prohibiting use of force and prohibiting
intervention from statements such as General Assembly resolutions and
finding that it was sufficient if state practice was generally consistent
with statements of rules in such documents.97 The dilution of the state
practice element is problematic. The decision has been the subject of
much discussion.98 We want to avoid the problem identified by Sir Robert
Jennings: “[M]ost of what we perversely persist in calling customary
international law is not only not customary law; it does not even faintly
resemble a customary law.”99 Koskenniemi identifies the problem:
“Sometimes standards are included in custom regardless of whether they
have been backed by a history of general compliance. ‘Custom’ has
become a generic name for nearly all non-conventional standards,
including acts and decisions of international organizations and
conferences.”100 He laments:
A remarkable fact about custom is that it is constantly in danger
collapsing either into tacit agreement or a naturalistic principle. The
function of a separate doctrine about custom is to make room for a law
between these two; a law understood in an ascending fashion (as
agreement) and a law understood in a descending way (as non-consensual
principle).101

Conceptual distinctions should be made between rules: (1) derived
from a reasoning process; (2) seen as self-evident in a natural law sense;
and (3) identified as social practices, such as customary rules. If we
ignore these concepts, we risk conflating custom with general principles

97. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 99100 (June 27); see Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 758–
59 (2001).
98. See, e.g., Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTRALIAN YEARBOOK OF INT’L L. 82
(1992); Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 757 (2001).
99. Roberts, supra note 97, at 759.
100. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 55, at 392 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 397 (citation omitted).
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of law, another distinct source of international law.102 More generally and
perhaps more seriously, confusion about concepts could lead to mistakes
in making determinations about legal obligations.
Of course, maintaining clarity on the concept of custom does not
mean that we have to maintain strict formal boundaries around the
sources of international law. The process of deriving customary norms
from treaties of widespread significance was partly at issue in both
Nicaragua and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the most
important of ICJ decisions on the role of customary international law.103
The relevance of this discussion for Friedmann’s second claim is that
if we dilute the state practice element for the formation of customary
international law, it will be formed more quickly and so its slow-moving
formation may be less a worry, though its clumsy nature may still
persist, whatever that may mean. If the primary inquiry to find custom is
opinio juris, then judges might have more discretion to find it. The bigger
worry just might become its coherence.
Third, Friedmann criticizes customary international law as
unsuitable for an international law of cooperation because of its
homogeneity. According to Friedmann, it is meant for a small club of
“Western powers” and does not reflect the realities of a pluralistic
international society. This claim seems to contradict the validity criteria
for custom. We now have to account for an increasing number of states,
all of which have state practice, and their sense of legal obligation (opinio
juris) has to be evaluated in any process of identifying custom. These
facts suggest to us that custom just might be more difficult to find, unless
we take an ambitious view of Nicaragua and continue to weaken the
state practice element. Friedmann’s claim may be a product of the times
of his writing, when post-colonial states struggled to construct a new
international economic order in which particular aspects of classical
international law were seen to be in the way of true independence. While
published sometime after Friedmann’s book, one can sense the tension in
Prosper Weil’s well-known article lamenting the relative normativity of
international law, published in the American Journal of International
Law in 1983.104
102. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat 1031 (entered
into force Oct. 24, 1945) (“the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”); see
Bin Cheng, Custom: The Future of General State Practice in a Divided World, in THE
STRUCTURE AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN LEGAL DOCTRINE, PHILOSOPHY
AND THEORY (Ronald St. John McDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds., 1983).
103. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14; North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (1969).
104. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J.
INT’L L. 413 (1983). On Weil’s article, see John Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative
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Fourth, Friedmann argued that customary international law has a
limited domain, dealing only with coexistence. Much of customary
international law does indeed deal with coexistence. Some of those rules
on coexistence are fundamental in nature, relating to, for example, the
lawful use of force.105 The domain of customary international law has to
be understood in the context of its relationship to other sources, and in
particular, to treaties. We can think of general international law as
having a constitutional function in the international legal system. The
rules of at least universal customary international law are binding on all
states.106 They may be seen as filling gaps left by treaties.107 Beyond gap
filling, custom interacts with treaties in a number of nuanced ways.
Relating to Friedmann’s fifth argument, some treaties codify custom.
Others go further and reflect progressive development of international
law. Customary rules may have relevance in treaty regimes on dispute
settlement.108 Custom may develop out of treaty rules that are widely
accepted and get incorporated into state practice.109 Treaties may rely on
custom for various legal standards, and states and tribunals may have to
resort to this preexisting custom when applying a treaty. Treaty
interpretation may solidify into custom about the particular meanings of
treaty provisions.
Trachtman is right to conclude that custom will have a subsidiary
role in an international law of cooperation. On this issue, he is wellsupported by Friedmann and others. Returning to Trachtman’s
functionalism, the various areas of international activity that he has
identified as in need of more international law will be in need of treaties
as the primary source of international law. As treaty-making among
states develops further in the areas of cyberspace and cyber-security,
environmental protection and public health, global finance, and economic
liberalization, it would be worth further study at a future date to see
what has happened to customary international law and to determine
whether the predictions of this section as to its fate are accurate.

Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case, 16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
85 (1996).
105. See Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Revisited, 1
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 1 (2002).
106. Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far
Can We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 535–36 (2001).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 537.
109. See North Sea, 1969 I.C.J. 3; Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14.
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CONCLUSION
The Future of International Law performs an important function for
international law. It guides us on what a new institutional economist
might call the possibilities for an “institutional design” for a global
society. Given its grounding in new institutional economics, it is
pragmatic about the possibilities of cooperation, looking closely at the
social costs of such cooperation and the strategic behavior of
international actors. This is important work.
In his 1977 work, Just and Unjust Wars, Michael Walzer, writing in
the context of the United Nations Charter as a legal instrument during
the Cold War, said: “The lawyers have constructed a paper world, which
fails at crucial points to correspond to the world the rest of us still live
in.”110 He also argued:
Policy[-]oriented lawyers are in fact moral and political philosophers, and
it would be best if they presented themselves in that way. Or,
alternatively, they are would-be legislators, not jurists or students of the
law. They are committed, or most of them are committed, to restructuring
international society—a worthwhile task—but they are not committed to
expounding its present structure.111

The divisions Walzer identifies are instructive but may not capture
fully the work that many academic lawyers undertake, going beyond
description and exercises in elucidating the internal coherence of
international law. Many contemporary “policy-oriented” international
lawyers operate in a middle ground. They are not Kant’s “sorry
comforters,” nor have they abandoned traditional legal analysis.
Depending on the tradition in which they work, policy-oriented lawyers
can use a thorough knowledge of the positive law for critique, in
evaluation, in putting the law through a procedure of moral justification,
in developing policy choices, in advising on institutional design, and in
exposing ideologies. These tasks take both knowledge of the law and an
understanding of another discipline, usually in the social sciences or
philosophy. The Future of International Law successfully takes this
110. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH
HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS xx–xxi (1977). These arguments remind us of Onora O’Neill’s
concerns about reliance on positive law of human rights. See ONORA O’NEILL, BOUNDS OF
JUSTICE 99–100 (2000).
111. WALZER, supra note 110, at xxi. Walzer went on to explain his own task to be
“to account for the ways in which mans and women who are not lawyers but simply citizens
(and sometimes soldiers) argue about war, and to expound the terms we commonly use.” Id.
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middle ground and promotes a significant advance of our understanding
of international law.

